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SEARCHING FOR CLIVEN BUNDY:  
THE CONSTITUTION AND PUBLIC LANDS 
Ian Bartrum* 
Jerry Bondi: “Jack, I’m going to tell you something. The world that you live in 
doesn’t exist. Maybe it never did. Out there is the real world. And 
it’s got real borders and real fences, real laws and real trouble. 
And you either go by the rules or you lose. You lose everything.” 
Jack Burns: “You can always keep something.” 
-Lonely Are the Brave1 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 14th, 1847, under cover of darkness, General Antonio López 
de Santa Anna and 9,000 loyal troops withdrew from Mexico City, effectively 
surrendering the capital to General Winfield Scott’s invading American forces.2 
When interim Mexican President Manuel de la Peña y Peña could establish a 
stable governing coalition, he sent representatives to entreat with American com-
missioner Nicholas Trist at the Villa de Guadalupe, near a local shrine to Mex-
ico’s patron saint.3 On February 2nd, 1848, both sides put their hands to a final 
treaty, in which Mexico ceded nearly half of its territory—including most of 
modern day New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah, parts of Colorado and 
Wyoming, and all of California—for the price of 15 million American dollars. 
The Senate ratified the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on March 10th, and, seem-
ingly, America’s continental destiny was manifest.4 
Through the early 1850s, settling Mormons claimed territorial rights over 
much of modern Nevada and the gold-rush trail to California.5 By the end of the 
decade, however, they had largely withdrawn to Utah and the Arizona Strip; and, 
with the Civil War looming, Congress established a distinct Nevada Territory in 
1861.6 Congressional Republicans hoped the new territory would quickly accede 
                                                        
*  Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. Thanks to Bret Birdsong, Jen-
nifer Gross, Kirk Siegler, David Orentlicher, Michael Stickler, James Rich, and Ken Ritter. 
1  LONELY ARE THE BRAVE (Universal Pictures 1962) (written by Dalton Trumbo). 
2  For an excellent account of the end of the Mexican War, see generally RICHARD GRISWOLD 
DEL CASTILLO, THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: A LEGACY OF CONFLICT 30–42 (1990). 
3  Id. at 41 fig.1.  
4  Id. at 46. 
5  For an excellent and fascinating overview of this period, see generally MICHAEL S. GREEN, 
NEVADA: A HISTORY OF THE SILVER STATE 63–82 (2015). 
6  Id. at 81–82. 
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to statehood, thereby providing three new electoral votes for Abraham Lincoln, 
and an additional vote for the 13th Amendment.7 Thus, as the 1864 election drew 
near, Congress hastily passed an act to open Nevada’s path to statehood, leaving 
only the final power of approval to Lincoln himself.8 Nevadans quickly assem-
bled a constitutional convention in Carson City in July, and then held a successful 
public vote on September 7th.9 On October 31, just a week before the election, 
Lincoln officially declared Nevada a state.10  
An uncontroversial provision of both the Enabling Act and the state’s Con-
stitution promised that Nevadans would, among other things, “forever disclaim 
all right and title to unappropriated public lands lying within [their] territory, 
[which] shall be and remain at the sole and entire disposition of the United 
States.”11 Such “disclaimer clauses” were commonplace in state enabling acts, 
primarily as a mechanism for quieting title to disputed tracts, so that Congress 
might eventually make clean transfer to future parties.12 When Nevada became a 
state, virtually all of its bounded territory was thus disclaimed.13 The Enabling 
Act went on, however, to promise that Congress would grant a portion of this 
unappropriated land to the new state for the construction of common schools, 
public buildings, and a state prison.14 In addition, five percent of Congress’s 
                                                        
7  Id. at 90. 
8  MICHAEL W. BOWERS, SAGEBRUSH STATE: NEVADA’S HISTORY, GOVERNMENT, AND POLITICS 
23 (2d ed. 2002). 
9  Id. 
10  GREEN, supra note 5, at 91. Republicans would basically sweep the state elections, and the 
presidential vote—though only two of Nevada’s three electors actually succeeded in voting. 
Id. 
11  NEV. CONST. ordinance 1 (1864); Nevada Enabling Act § 4, ch. 36, 13 Stat. 30 (1864). The 
state further promised to: (1) outlaw slavery; (2) guarantee the freedom of religion; (3) tax 
nonresident landholders at the same rate as residents; and (4) not impose any taxes on federal 
lands without congressional approval. NEV. CONST. ordinance 1; Nevada Enabling Act § 4.  
The entire constitution received overwhelming popular support, passing by an 8-1 margin. 
BOWERS, supra note 8, at 23. 
12  Similar language appears in enabling acts dating all the way back to the Northwest Ordi-
nance of 1787, the particular language of which clearly explains these clauses’ rationale: “The 
legislatures of . . . new States, shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the 
United States in Congress assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary 
for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.” Northwest Ordinance art. 4 (July 
13, 1787), in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 334, 341 (Worthington C. Ford et. 
al. eds., 1904–1937). Similar clauses appear in the acts enabling all of the western continental 
states. See Steven Miller, Broken Compact: The Hollowing-Out of Nevada Statehood, NEV. 
POL’Y RES. INST., http://www.npri.org/docLib/20130813_NPRIBrokenCompactReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B83N-N9SJ] (last visited Feb. 5, 2018). 
13  There are, apparently, no precise records of the acreage thus disclaimed, as surveying ef-
forts did not commence until the following year—though the Nevada State Lands agency has 
said that “very little land had been claimed for private ownership.” Email from Diane M. 
Lightwood, Nev. State Data Ctr. Coordinator, Nev. State Library, to Jennifer Gross, Head of 
Collections, Wieners-Rogers Law Library, William S. Boyd School of Law (Oct. 17, 2017, 
17:00:00 PDT) (on file with author).  
14  Nevada Enabling Act §§ 7–9. Congress promptly ceded more than 5 million acres of land 
for these purposes in 1865. NEVADA SURVEYOR-GENERAL, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR OF 
1865 5–6 (1866), http://www.nsladigitalcollections.org/browse/surveyorgeneralofnevada 
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profit on all future land sales would go to the state to pay for roads and irrigation 
projects.15 At present, roughly 80% of the land within Nevada’s boundaries re-
mains under federal management.16 
For the next half century, relatively few settlers tried to wrangle a living out 
of Nevada’s arid rangelands. That changed in the early 1930s, however, as the 
Dust Bowl and the Great Depression conspired to drive thousands of migrant 
farmers west, in search of new lands and new lives.17 Overgrazing and land dis-
putes, together with a push to modernize agricultural practices, led Congress to 
pass the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934.18 The Act divided federal lands into grazing 
districts for federal management and agricultural improvement, and the Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM) now administers over 150 million acres of federal 
rangeland for public use.19 The Act also established a permitting system, 
whereby ranchers could pay fees to graze their cattle on public lands.20 In 1976, 
Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), which 
modernized the permitting system, and, more controversially, declared that “the 
public lands shall be retained in Federal ownership, unless . . . it is determined 
that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national interest.”21 
On April 5th, 2014, BLM temporarily closed over 500,000 acres of public 
land in Clark and Lincoln Counties in order to impound cattle grazing there in 
violation of a federal district court order.22 These cattle belonged, principally, to 
Cliven Bundy and his family—ranchers from Bunkerville, Nevada—who had 
stopped paying BLM permitting fees in the early 1990s.23 In anticipation of the 
                                                        
reports18651930#/item/000000083100669/view [https://perma.cc/YV9C-W3NG] (last vis-
ited Feb. 5, 2018). 
15  Nevada Enabling Act § 10. 
16  This number is down from roughly 86% in 1990. CAROL H. VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RES. 
SERV., R-42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 8, 16 (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf [https://perma.cc/73MW-UWKJ]. 
17  See Virgil Hurlburt, The Taylor Grazing Act, 11 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 203, 203–04 
(1935) (recounting the Act’s historical and economic background). 
18  Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 73 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 315–316o (2012)) [hereinafter “Grazing Act”]. 
19  The Taylor Grazing Act originally created the Department of Interior Grazing Division for 
this purpose; the Grazing Division combined with the General Land Office to form BLM in 
1946. Vincent et. al., supra note 16, at 4. For the basics of rangeland management, see gener-
ally Bureau of Land Management’s Rangeland Administration System, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.: RANGELAND ADMIN. SYS., https://www.blm.gov/ras/ 
[https://perma.cc/E4CQ-D77Z] (last updated Dec. 4, 2012). 
20  Grazing Act § 3.  
21  Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012); see also id. § 1751. 
Passage of FLPMA instigated the so-called “Sagebrush Rebellion” of the late 1970s. 
22  Tom Ragan, Feds Start Rounding Up Bundy’s Cattle in Northeastern Clark County, L.V. 
REV.-J. (April 6, 2014, 7:57 AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/bundy-blm/feds-
start-rounding-up-bundys-cattle-in-northeastern-clark-county/ [https://perma.cc/ULJ9-
NPUF]. For the District Court order, see generally United States v. Bundy, No. 2:12-cv-0804-
LDG-GWF, 2013 WL 3463610 (D. Nev. July 9, 2013). 
23  Dan Hernandez & Joseph Langdon, Federal Rangers Face Off Against Armed Protestors 
in Nevada Range War, GUARDIAN (April 14, 2014, 9:36 AM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2014/apr/13/nevada-bundy-cattle-ranch-armed-protesters 
[https://perma.cc/Y3V4-9P49].  
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roundup, the Bundys put out a distress call to militia-like groups around the coun-
try, and seven days later, an armed crowd confronted federal and state officers in 
the desert near Gold Butte.24 Another week later, federal authorities backed 
down, citing “serious concern[s] about the safety of employees and members of 
the public.”25 Then, two years later, Cliven Bundy’s sons, Ammon and Ryan, led 
a 41-day occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge near Burns, Ore-
gon.26 An Oregon jury refused to convict the Bundy brothers, and—citing “fla-
grant” prosecutorial misconduct—Judge Gloria Navarro dismissed with preju-
dice all charges stemming from the Nevada showdown.27 
To some, the Bundys are heroic republican farmers in the best Jeffersonian 
tradition—taking a principled stand against tyrannical federal overreach.28 To 
others, they are welfare cowboys—tragically exploiting subsidized common 
lands on a fabricated constitutional pretense.29 To many in law enforcement, they 
are simply outlaws—blowing a dog whistle for domestic terrorist groups like the 
Sovereign Citizens in a dangerous game of chicken with federal agents.30  
According to friends, Cliven Bundy is a quiet, private man and sincerely 
believes in the righteousness of his cause, and in the legal case he thinks he can 
make.31 In truth, however, the logic of that argument is often difficult to make 
                                                        
24  Id. For a version of this call, emailed to the militia members of Operation Military Aid, see 
generally Superseding Criminal Indictment at 25, United States v. Bundy, 2:16-CR-00046-
GMN-PAL (D. Nev. March 2, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/830656/download 
[https://perma.cc/T33A-PEGH] [hereinafter “Indictment”]. 
25  Jaime Fuller, The Long Fight Between the Bundys and the Federal Government, From 1989 
to Today, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp 
/2014/04/15/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-long-fight-between-cliven-bundy-and-
the-federal-government/?utm_term=.126e5e0b419e [https://perma.cc/XL8P-ZDUN]. 
26  See generally Carissa Wolf, Peter Holley & Wesley Lowery, Armed Men, Led by Bundy 




27  Courtney Sherwood & Kirk Johnson, Bundy Brothers Acquitted in Takeover of Oregon 
Wildlife Refuge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/us/bundy-
brothers-acquitted-in-takeover-of-oregon-wildlife-refuge.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/L6UP-
M669]; Ken Ritter, Cliven Bundy Emerges Free, Defiant After Nevada Case Tossed, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/a5c9d9736cea4d5a94f6cdb 
1528bee8d [https://perma.cc/92MW-JJY6]. 
28  E.g., Laurie Roberts, Arizona Legislators See Cliven Bundy as a Hero?, AZ CENT. (April 
10, 2014), http://www.azcentral.com/story/laurie-roberts/2014/04/19/bundy-livingston/78738 
13/ [https://perma.cc/3UMU-39M5]. 
29  E.g., Ron Eachus, Nevada Rancher Is Just a Welfare Cowboy, STATESMAN J. (April 21, 
2014), http://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/opinion/2014/04/22/nevada-rancher-is-just-a-
welfare-cowboy/7988891/ [https://perma.cc/7WGM-V3HN]. 
30 See, e.g., J. Oliver Conroy, They Hate the US Government, and They’re Multiplying: The 
Terrifying Rise of ‘Sovereign Citizens,’ GUARDIAN (May 15, 2017), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2017/may/15/sovereign-citizens-rightwing-terrorism-hate-us-government 
[https://perma.cc/8JXJ-5QG9]. 
31  Interview with Michael Stickler (Cliven Bundy biographer) (October 17, 2017) (notes on 
file with author). 
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out, and courts and commentators alike have generally dismissed it out of hand.32 
In this essay, I hope to piece Bundy’s legal position together as completely and 
plausibly as I can—to make the best case I can on his behalf—before turning a 
critical eye on his claims. 
To that end, the first section below explores the arguments that Bundy has 
made about preemptive or prescriptive property rights, federal property reten-
tion, and the equal footing doctrine. Because these claims sometimes seem cob-
bled together a bit incoherently, the second section considers separately the legal 
roots of each constituent theory. Finally, the third section analyzes the constitu-
tional claims within the practical modalities of constitutional argument.33 For 
textual, historical, and structural reasons, I ultimately conclude that Bundy has 
failed to make a persuasive case—though he has undoubtedly tapped into a pow-
erful current of modern constitutional ethos.  
I. CLIVEN BUNDY’S STORY 
As Cliven Bundy tells it, his ancestors traveled west in 1847 with Mormon 
missionaries to settle near Bunkerville, when it was still Mexican territory.34 If 
that is true, the family was nominally subject to three different political regimes 
over the next 17 years: the Gobierno Federal de Mexico, the United States Con-
gress, and the State of Nevada.35 More importantly, from Bundy’s perspective, 
his ancestors began putting the land and water to beneficial use even before they 
came under Congressional control, and in so doing established “preemptive” 
claims—essentially, in Bundy’s mind, squatters’ rights—to the property.36 
                                                        
32  See, e.g., United States v. Bundy, No. CV-S-98-531-JBR, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23835 
(D. Nev. 1998); United States v. Bundy, No. 2:12-cv-0804-LDG-GWF, 2013 WL 3463610 
(D. Nev. 2013). 
33  For more on Philip Bobbitt’s description of legitimate constitutional practice, see generally: 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1980); accord Ian 
Bartrum, The Modalities of Constitutional Argument: A Primer, in LINDA H. EDWARDS, 
READINGS IN PERSUASION: BRIEFS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2012). 
34  MICHAEL STICKLER, CLIVEN BUNDY: AMERICAN TERRORIST PATRIOT 93–95 (2017). 
35  I note here, for lack of a better place, that Bundy has sometimes claimed that his ranch fell 
within either the Utah or Arizona Territory until Congress moved the Nevada border east and 
south in 1866–67. Id. at 98–99. In this way, he argues that the Nevada Disclaimer Clause does 
not apply to the relevant property, which must therefore belong to the state. Id. This is an 
interesting and creative argument, especially because Nevada’s consenting legislation speaks 
of “additional territory ceded by the United States.” See Joint Resolution in Relation to the 
Boundaries of the State of Nevada, and the Acceptance of Additional Territory Ceded by the 
United States to this State, in STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEVADA FOR 1867, at 145 (1867). 
Upon careful examination, however, it turns out that Congress spoke only of changed “bound-
aries,” and made even this enlargement expressly subject to the conditions “provided for and 
consented to in the constitution of the State of Nevada.” See Act Concerning the Boundaries 
of the State of Nevada, ch. 73, 14 Stat. 43 (1866). When the Nevada Legislature consented to 
the new political boundaries, then, it did so under the terms of the state constitution—includ-
ing, of course, the Disclaimer Clause. Thus, all unappropriated lands remained in federal own-
ership. 
36  See STICKLER, supra note 34, at 93–95. Bundy characterizes these as “ancestral” rights, and 
suggests that they include “his water rights, his grazing rights, his property rights in the way 
of range improvements, and his inalienable rights to live in a way that makes his life full and 
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Though his great-grandfather moved to the Arizona Strip for a time, Bundy says 
his mother’s family continued to ranch the Bunkerville land through the home-
steading era and into the Taylor Grazing and FLPMA eras; and that they, like 
others, initially welcomed federal management.37 In the early 1990s, however, as 
BLM began to protect habitat for the newly endangered desert tortoise, Bundy 
chafed at ever more restrictive grazing regulations.38 When he came to believe 
that BLM cared more about environmentalists than ranchers, he says he “fired” 
the agency and stopped paying grazing fees.39  
Bundy also makes several constitutional arguments. He says that the federal 
government has no legal authority to acquire or own land within a state’s territo-
rial boundaries, unless it is land purchased and used pursuant to the so-called 
Enclave Clause.40 Despite contrary language in, among other places, the Property 
Clause, Bundy argues that the federal government must dispose of all its enclosed 
landholdings at the time a territory becomes a state.41 He bases this counterintu-
itive claim largely on the so-called equal footing doctrine, which he says ensures 
that each new state enters the Union with the same title to public lands that the 
original thirteen states enjoyed.42 This means, to Bundy at least, that virtually all 
of the land within Nevada’s boundaries became state land in 1864. And if anyone 
has the right to regulate his grazing practices, it is the state, or perhaps the Clark 
County Sherriff—but not the federal government. 
Bundy, by his own admission, is no lawyer, and it should be no surprise that 
his legalistic claims sometimes seem to get confused in the storytelling. In the 
subsections that follow, I try to clear up this confusion and present the best legal 
case for each of Bundy’s propositions. He did not, in other words, invent these 
arguments out of whole cloth—there are academics and other lawyers who have 
                                                        
complete (happy).” Id. at 92–93. He also claims to have something like an easement or pre-
scriptive rights over the land. Id. at 117. 
37  Id. at 92. Bundy points to a statue of a maternal relative in Mesquite as evidence of this 
history. Id. On the initial federal management: “[T]he ranchers saw the fees they would pay 
for services that would be provided to them and that the fee was reasonable. So it made sense.” 
Id. at 122. In this way, Bundy seems to suggest that he entered into some sort of contract for 
services with BLM. Id. 
38  Id. at 126. The desert tortoise was first listed as endangered under the Endangered Species 
Act in 1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 12178 (April 2, 1990). 
39  STICKLER, supra note 34, at 124–25. 
40  Id. at 95-96. The Enclave Clause authorizes Congress, 
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten 
square miles) as may, by Cession of particular states and the Acceptance of Congress, become the 
Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places pur-
chased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection 
of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17. 
41  The Property Clause provides: 
The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Con-
stitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular 
State. 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 3. 
42  STICKLER, supra note 34, at 105. 
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made similar claims—and, rather than knock down a strawman, I hope to put 
Bundy’s case in its most coherent and favorable legal form before raising my 
objections. 
II. PROPERTY CLAIMS: PREEMPTIVE OR PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS 
These are difficult cases to make on Bundy’s behalf.43 It is difficult not be-
cause preemptive and prescriptive property rights do not exist, but because the 
facts—even if we take Bundy’s own account entirely at face value—do not ac-
tually establish any such claims. With that said, however, I will lay out the legal 
groundwork for preemptive and prescriptive rights, before explaining why 
Bundy cannot assert them. 
A. Preemptive Rights 
The first way that the Bundys might have acquired preemptive property 
rights is under the federal Preemption Act of 1841.44 When the Panic of 1837 
crushed the hopes of many western squatters, Congress—still eager to promote 
settlement—passed the Preemption Act to help protect those pioneers “who have 
spent two years of trial and hardship together with large sums of money in im-
proving their lands [and who] would be wholly unable to purchase them even at 
the minimum [market] price.”45 The Act provided that a settler could venture 
onto surveyed public land, stake and improve a claim, and then enjoy a right of 
first refusal to purchase up to 160 acres at a minimum price of $1.25 per acre.46 
To be eligible, a settler had to: be the head of a family, a widow, or a single man 
over 21; be an American citizen or have declared that intention; and not own 
more than 319 acres of land in any state or territory.47 A settler could exercise 
the preemptive right only once, and, to acquire a fully vested right, he or she 
must have recorded title with the registrar of the appropriate land district.48 
Another possible source of preemptive rights is the federal Homestead Act 
of 1862.49 By the early 1860s, Congress had sold off most of the best, most arable 
                                                        
43  This perhaps explains why Bundy himself has not generally made these claims in court. 
See, e.g., Bundy’s Opposition to United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to 
Dismiss, United States v. Bundy, No. CV 2:12-cv-00804-LDG-GWF (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2013). 
But he does continue to make them in the press and elsewhere. See, e.g., STICKLER, supra note 
34, at 101, 117–18. 
44  General Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453 (1841) [hereinafter “Preemption Act”]. 
For an excellent overview of this period, see generally ROY M. ROBBINS, OUR LANDED 
HERITAGE: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 1776–1936, at 75–92 (1942). This Act replaced a series of 
temporary laws that recognized the retrospective rights of pre-existing squatters. Id. at 89–91. 
Bundy, however, does not claim that his family’s settlement took place before 1841. 
45  ROBBINS, supra note 44, at 75 (statement of Racine Argus (Feb. 14, 1838)). 
46  Preemption Act, §§ 9, 10. 
47  Id. § 10. 
48  Id. § 13. 
49  Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 37 Stat. 392 (1862) [hereinafter “Homestead Act”]. For a 
brief overview of the homesteading era, see GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL 
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 104–07 (6th ed. 2007). 
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public lands, and, as it became increasingly difficult to get a cash return, Con-
gress effectively began to give away the land it wanted settled quickly.50 Con-
gressional Republicans, who had won a majority in 1856, hoped that liberalizing 
federal land grants in the West would encourage settlement by small farmers, 
who then would populate future free (rather than slave) states.51 The terms of the 
Homestead Act were nearly identical to the Preemption Act. The same classes of 
people were eligible, with the new exclusion of any person who had ever “borne 
arms against the United States or given aid or comfort to its enemies.”52 Again, 
a settler could enter onto unappropriated surveyed land and stake a claim of not 
more than 160 acres.53 And, again, he or she could exercise the right of preemp-
tion by purchasing the land for not less than $1.25 an acre.54  
The new Act, however, also allowed a settler who occupied and improved 
the land over a continuous five-year period to acquire fully vested property rights 
simply by paying a $10 fee and recording title.55 To prevent rampant speculation, 
the Act further required applicants to swear that they would use the land for “ac-
tual settlement and cultivation.”56 By the 1880s, homesteading had largely re-
placed preemption as the predominant means of settlement in the West.57 When 
160 acres proved too small an allotment for successful ranching on more arid 
rangelands, Congress passed the Enlarged Homestead Act (1909) and the Stock-
Raising Homestead Act (1916), which increased the allowable acreage to 320 
and 640 acres, respectively.58  
Cliven Bundy, however, has not—to my knowledge—ever made a case that 
his pioneer family availed themselves of either of these federal statutes. As an 
initial matter, the land in question does not appear to have been surveyed until 
1865, and was thus ineligible for preemption or homesteading until a year after 
Nevada became a state.59 If we are to take Bundy’s constitutional arguments se-
riously, Congress no longer owned the land at that time, and thus cannot have 
conveyed property rights to anyone. Even if we allow for an argument in the 
alternative—such that the preemption claims pertain only if the constitutional 
arguments fail—Bundy has never suggested that his rights are limited to 160, or 
even 640, acres; nor that his family purchased or recorded any relevant title.60 
                                                        
50  On this period of liberalized land grants, see ROBBINS, supra note 44 at 208–237.  
51  Id. at 208–09. The thought was that small farmers would be in a state of “natural antago-
nism” with the plantation system. Id. at 209. 
52  Homestead Act, § 2. 
53  Id. § 1. 
54  Id. § 8. 
55  Id. § 2. 
56  Id. 
57  COGGINS ET. AL, supra note 49, at 105. 
58  Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909 § 3, ch. 160, 60 Stat. 639 (1909); Stock-Raising Home-
stead Act of 1916 § 3, ch. 9, 64 Stat. 862 (1916). Both the Preemption Act and the Homestead 
Acts were repealed by the FLPMA in 1976. 
59  See supra notes 13–14. 
60  Deposition of Cliven Bundy at 34–35, United States v. Cliven Bundy, No. 2:12-CV-804-
LDG-GWF (Oct. 3, 2011). Indeed, Bundy claims the entire 150,000 Gold Butte division as 
his “ranch.” Id. at 33. 
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Indeed, the only recorded title in the family name is for 160 acres and some water 
rights, dating to 1948.61  
It is true that initially the “[l]ands that remained in public ownership were 
considered to be a grazing commons for livestock owners,” but this practice gave 
rise to the “range wars” that the Taylor Grazing Act was intended, in part, to 
resolve.62 That Act made clear, if it had not been so before, that private property 
rights could not arise out of simply grazing the common public lands.63 Thus, 
even if Bundy was to concede that Congress retained possession of property in 
Nevada after statehood, he has yet to present a factual scenario in which the rel-
evant statutes would apply. For these reasons, he cannot successfully claim 
preemptive rights rooted in either the Preemption or Homestead Acts. 
With all that said, however, Bundy still sometimes claims to have preemp-
tive rights rooted in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo itself, which promised to 
protect the claims of Mexican property owners.64 Article VIII of the Treaty pro-
vides:  
Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico, . . . 
shall be free to continue where they now reside, . . . retaining the property which 
they possess in the said territories . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . [They] shall enjoy with respect to it guarantees equally ample as if the 
same belonged to citizens of the United States.65 
Bundy argues that the Constitution’s Treaty Clause (which he here concedes au-
thorizes federal land acquisition) thus ensures that the “supreme Law of the 
Land” now guarantees his ancestral property rights.66 Again, however, the facts 
seem to get in Bundy’s way. While his ancestors may have lived in Mexican 
territory, he has never produced any evidence that they were Mexican citizens 
before the Treaty—much less that they held any property rights recognized by 
the Mexican government. So, as with the statutory preemption claims, Bundy has 
simply failed to adduce any facts that would invoke the Treaty’s protections. 
 
                                                        
61  Steve Kanigher, An Abbreviated Look at Rancher Cliven Bundy’s Family History, 
LASVEGASNOW.COM, http://www.lasvegasnow.com/news/an-abbreviated-look-at-rancher-
cliven-bundys-family-history/70830238 [https://perma.cc/6QY9-HHS9] (last visited Feb. 12, 
2018). The size of the deeded parcel—160 acres—suggests that it might originally have been 
disposed of under either the Preemption or Homestead Acts; the Bundys, however, purchased 
it from another family, who may have originally acquired title in one of these ways. Id. 
62  COGGINS ET. AL, supra note 49, at 105. 
63  Grazing Act, § 3. The Act did allow for preferential assignment of grazing districts based 
upon preexisting improvements or water rights. Id. 
64  Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo art. VIII, Mex.-U.S., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922. 
65  Id. 
66  STICKLER, supra note 34, at 101; U.S. CONST. art. VI. One might note, again, that Bundy 
must recognize federal land ownership—which he has repeatedly rejected—in order to claim 
this protection. 
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B. Prescriptive Rights 
Bundy also sometimes talks about prescriptive property rights arising, pre-
sumably, under state law.67 Though Bundy has never made this argument to a 
court, other like-minded Nevada ranchers have tried it on.68 In fact, in 2013 
rancher Wayne Hage found a sympathetic judge in the Federal District Court—
although the Ninth Circuit decisively overruled that decision and issued a “rare 
and extraordinary” reprimand to the lower court judge.69 Hage claimed title to 
stock water rights on federal land.70 Between 1978 and 1993, Hage paid for per-
mits to graze cattle on that land, and thus utilized the water source thereon.71 
When he died in 2006, he had not held a relevant permit in 13 years, but he had 
claimed that he owned a prescriptive right—an easement—to have his cattle 
cross the land to get to the water.72 Essentially, this would be analogous to the 
sort of “easement by necessity” that arises when property is subdivided in such 
a way that an interior parcel has no access to public roads or byways.73 In such 
circumstances, the landlocked property may enjoy a prescriptive right to cross 
the enclosing parcel.74 
Unfortunately for Hage, and also for Bundy’s rhetorical case here, this ar-
gument has no grounding in law. The common law provides: 
An easement by necessity is created when: (1) the title to two parcels of land was 
held by a single owner; (2) the unity of title was severed by a conveyance of one 
of the parcels; and (3) at the time of severance, the easement was necessary for 
the owner of the severed parcel to use his property.75 
Under Nevada law, however, a water right confers ownership of “neither the land 
nor the water”; it simply recognizes authority to put the water to beneficial use.76 
                                                        
67  See Kanigher, supra note 61 (“My family has preemptive, adjudicated livestock water rights 
filed with the state of Nevada. They were established in 1877 . . . .”). I presume the state law 
claim based on Bundy’s rejection of federal property ownership. The law is clear, however, 
that federal law “governs a claim of easement over lands owned by the United States.” McFar-
land v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008). Indeed, Nevada has itself recog-
nized that the Taylor Grazing Act preempted any such state law claims. Ansolabehere v. La-
borde, 310 P.2d 842, 849–50 (Nev. 1957). 
68  Sean Whaley, U.S. Supreme Court Closes Book on Wayne Hage, Sagebrush Rebellion 
Court Case, L.V. REV.-J. (Oct. 26, 2016, 2:59 AM), https://www.reviewjour-
nal.com/news/politics-and-government/nevada/us-supreme-court-closes-book-on-wayne-
hage-sagebrush-rebellion-court-case/ [https://perma.cc/ET3H-ESPU]. 
69  United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 722–24 (9th Cir. 2016). On Senior District 
Court Judge Robert Clive Jones’s erratic behavior in this and other cases, see Jane Ann Mor-
rison, Nevada’s Most-Reversed Federal Judge Should Call It Quits, L.V. REV.-J., (March 16, 
2016, 5:29 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/news-columns/jane-ann-morrison/ne-
vadas-most-reversed-federal-judge-should-call-it-quits/ [https://perma.cc/WS9D-SAMY]. 
70  Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d at 715. 
71  Id. 
72  Id.  
73  Id. 
74  McFarland v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008). 
75  Id. (quoting Fitzgerald Living Trust v. United States, 460 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
76  United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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In the case of Hage’s water right, then, there has been no severance of title—
there is simply no second, enclosed parcel that might give rise to the necessity.77 
The Ninth Circuit has recognized a statutory easement in these circumstances, 
such that Hage might possess a right of way over federal lands for the purpose 
of diverting the water “by ‘the construction of ditches and canals.’”78 Such an 
easement would not, however, “entitle[] him to an appurtenant right to graze” on 
the federal land.79 In other words, Hage might bring the water across federal land 
to his cattle, but if he wants his cattle to eat their way over to the water, he still 
needs a grazing permit.80 
Whatever the rhetorical power of Cliven Bundy’s occasional claims to 
preemptive or prescriptive property rights, then, these arguments find no pur-
chase in the law.81 Beginning in the mid-19th century, Congress liberally dis-
posed of western lands between 1862 and 1937—essentially giving them away 
for the price of filing—but Bundy’s family never took advantage of these federal 
initiatives. This may have been a rational decision: Why pay for common lands 
you can use for free?  But when the Taylor Grazing Act put an end to the common 
lands policy, it would have made sense to stake an actual claim and perfect title. 
Indeed, this is what the Bundy family appears to have done with the deed rec-
orded in 1948.  He cannot now make a legal claim, however, to land that the 
family was either unwilling or unable to purchase at that time. Alternatively, if 
Bundy can show, as Wayne Hage did, that he owns water rights on federal land 
that predate FLPMA, he might be able to divert that water across federal land to 
his cattle. But he cannot use the water right to do an end run around grazing fees. 
For these reasons, Bundy’s appeal to notions of preemptive or prescriptive prop-
erty rights ultimately fall well short of the mark. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS: FEDERAL LANDS AND EQUAL FOOTING  
Congress’s authority to acquire and retain property within a state is a much 
more controversial issue—at least among some constitutional historians.82 This, 
then, is Cliven Bundy’s strongest potential argument, and it is in fact the only 
                                                        
77  Id.  
78  Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d at 717 (quoting Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148, 154 (9th 
Cir. 1967)). FLPMA overruled the statutory basis for these diversionary easements, but left 
preexisting claims intact. See 43 U.S.C. § 1769(a) (2012). 
79  Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d at 717–18 (discussing Hunter, 388 F.2d 148). 
80  It worth noting that, even if Hage could succeed in claiming some kind of easement—such 
as the statutory rights for public roads established in the Mining Act of 1866—the federal 
government “retains the right to issue reasonable regulations” on that right of way. Hage, 810 
F.3d at 719. A grazing permit certainly qualifies as a reasonable regulation.  
81  It is certainly worth noting that the U.S. Court of Federal Claims very recently upheld a 
claim of regulatory takings based on the imposition of grazing fees to access a stock water 
right on federal land. Sacramento Grazing Assoc. v. United States, 2017 WL 5029063 (Fed. 
Cl. 2017). Depending upon appeal, this may be an interesting new legal avenue for ranchers. 
82  Indeed, the State of Nevada has even enacted legislation asserting title over federal lands 
within its boundaries. NEV. REV. STAT §§ 321.596–.599 (1979). The Federal District Court 
subsequently declared these statutes invalid. See United States v. Nye Cty., 920 F. Supp. 1108 
(D. Nev. 1996). 
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one he has made in official filings. To be clear, there is no doubt that controlling 
constitutional doctrine, well-settled in the Supreme Court, expressly recognizes 
the federal government’s power to acquire, retain, and regulate such property, 
with or without state consent83—which explains why Bundy has repeatedly lost 
in the courts.84 There are, however, some lawyers and academics who believe 
that the Supreme Court has gotten it wrong, and that the Constitution’s ratifiers 
never intended to give Congress such broad authority.85 In the following subsec-
tion, I will outline the strongest version of this claim, without critical comment, 
and save my analysis and assessment for the final subsection. 
As an initial matter, however, I should be clear that I know of no serious 
commentator who believes that the Enclave Clause provides the only federal au-
thority to acquire land, or that it establishes a size limitation on federal landhold-
ing. That Clause’s plain meaning does not limit federal power; rather, it grants 
Congress the power of “exclusive legislation” over property acquired in a partic-
ular way for particular purposes.86 The Clause simply does not speak to the other 
ways that the federal government might acquire land. At the very least, these 
include conquest,87 treaty,88 purchase,89 eminent domain,90 and under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.91 Such acquisitions are plainly the “territories and other 
property” contemplated in the Property Clause, which would otherwise be 
                                                        
83  E.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542–43 (1976); United States v. San Francisco, 
310 U.S. 16, 29–30 (1940); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 527 (1897); Gibson v. 
Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1871). Numerous other cases support this proposition. See Kleppe, 
426 U.S. at 540 (citing cases). 
84  See, e.g., United States v. Bundy, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23835 (D. Nev. 1998); United 
States v. Bundy, 2013 WL 3463610 (D. Nev. 2013). 
85  These accounts vary widely in strength: some scholars go as far as Bundy, while others 
make the weaker claim that Congress may only use federal lands for an enumerated purpose. 
For the stronger claim, see C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the 
Territories and the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43 (1949), and also Alfred W. 
Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues Surrounding Federal Own-
ership of the Federal Lands, 12 PAC. L. J. 693 (1981). For versions of the weaker claims, see: 
Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the Constitution’s Property Clause: The 
Original Understanding, 76 U. COL. L. REV. 327 (2005); Allison H. Eid, The Property Clause 
and the New Federalism, U. COL. L. REV. 1241 (2004); David E. Engdahl, State and Federal 
Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283 (1976). 
86  The only limiting language—“not to exceed ten square miles”—refers specifically to land 
acquired for a federal capital district. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17.  That limit does not apply 
even to the remainder of the Enclave Clause itself. Id. Indeed, the Enclave Clause appears on 
the list of federal power grants; the list of federal power limitations appears in the following 
section. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. Even if the so-called enumeration principle somehow implies 
an Enclave Clause limitation (notwithstanding the subsequent Property Clause), that limit 
would apply only to Congress acting in its legislative capacity—not when it acts in concert 
with the Executive branch in some of the ways discussed above. 
87  American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 542 (1828). 
88  Id. 
89  See, Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and Gov-
ernment by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393, 395–99 (1899) (dis-
cussing constitutional authority for the Louisiana Purchase). 
90  United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623, 627 (1871). 
91  Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373 (1875). 
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without effect.92  
There is, however, some reasonable disagreement about whether, or on 
what terms, the federal government can retain property when it falls within state 
boundaries. Broadly speaking, there are two sorts of accounts that dissent from 
the current doctrine. The first, more plausible and widely shared view—perhaps 
most closely associated with attorney and professor David Engdahl—is the so-
called “classic property clause doctrine.”93 This theory asserts that, while the En-
clave Clause grant of “exclusive Legislation in all cases whatsoever” gives Con-
gress plenary regulatory power in a limited set of cases, the broader Property 
Clause empowers Congress to preempt state regulation only when exercising an 
enumerated legislative power.94 Otherwise, the states may regulate the federal 
government just as they would any other landowner.   
While I disagree with the classic theory for several reasons,95 I need not 
explore those in depth here, because even if correct, this theory cannot help 
Cliven Bundy. First, Engdahl explicitly recognizes that requiring “permits for 
the use of [Property Clause] property, and similar matters of administration, were 
regarded as exercises of proprietary power rather than of any legislative or gov-
ernmental power.”96 Thus, Congress has the power, even as an ordinary proprie-
tor, to require the permits that Bundy has refused to acquire. Second, even if we 
were to concede arguendo that the Taylor Grazing Act and FLPMA are exercises 
of legislative power, both statutes (as applied to the Bundys) clearly fall within 
the scope of modern Commerce Clause authority.97 Thus, even if the Property 
Clause does not create an independent source of federal power, no such power is 
necessary to regulate grazing on public land.  
The second, and more restrictive, dissenting view of the Property Clause 
we might call the “trust theory.” While this account—most closely associated 
with C. Perry Patterson’s work in the late 1940s—enjoys much less scholarly 
support, it would, if correct, vindicate the Bundy’s claims.98 For this reason, I 
first state the trust theory as clearly and charitably as I can. Then, in the final 
subsection, I offer textual, historical, and structural reasons to reject Patterson’s 
view as a matter of constitutional law.  
A. The “Trust Theory” Stated 
Simply put, Patterson’s trust theory asserts that the federal government can 
                                                        
92  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. If Congress can acquire property only via the Enclave Clause—
which bestows the power of “exclusive Legislation”—the Property Clause’s authority to 
“make all needful rules and regulations” is simply redundant. 
93  Engdahl, supra note 85, at 288. 
94  Id. at 296, 304, 308–09. 
95  For a persuasive critique, see Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the “Classic” Property Clause 
Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617 (1985). 
96  Engdahl, supra note 85, at 309. 
97  One need look no further than Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
98  Patterson, supra note 85, at 56. Alfred Brodie has also advanced a version of this argument. 
See Brodie, supra note 85, at 721–22. 
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hold Property Clause land only in trust for future states.99 Thus, when Congress 
admits a new state, it must cede all enclosed public lands to that state as benefi-
ciary of the trust.100 Patterson’s argument develops in a series of cumulative 
steps,101 but the foundational claims center on a historical “compact” between 
the states and the Confederation Congress regarding territorial lands, and the fed-
eral government’s limited powers as successor-in-interest to that original agree-
ment.102  
As the Revolutionary War drew to a close, one of the stumbling blocks to 
American confederacy was the fate of the western lands.103 Seven states claimed 
lands that had not yet been settled, with Virginia asserting dominion all the way 
to the Pacific Ocean.104 States without such claims worried that the others would 
eventually cut their extended territories into political subsidiaries—New World 
empires—that would come to dominate federal politics.105 Maryland thus led the 
landless states in refusing to ratify the Articles of Confederation until the landed 
states agreed to cede their unsettled territory to the new Congress as common 
property.106 Patterson argues that these land cessions required some fancy polit-
ical footwork and a series of promises to the ceding states—which, together, he 
calls “the compact.”107 
Three documents are at the heart of Patterson’s argument. The first is a res-
olution the Continental Congress adopted in October, 1780, providing: 
That the unappropriated lands that may be ceded or relinquished to the United 
States, by any particular states . . . shall be disposed of for the common benefit of 
the United States, and be settled and formed into republican states, which shall 
become members of the federal union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, 
freedom and independence, as the other states[.]108 
The second is the Virginia Deed of Cession, by which that state conveyed her 
western lands to the Confederation Congress on March 1, 1784; and which re-
stated the terms of the resolution as conditions of the cession.109 The third is the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787—reenacted by the Federal Congress in 1789—
which laid out the specific “Articles of compact” and provided that any state 
carved out of the territory would “be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress 
                                                        
99  Patterson, supra note 85, at 56. 
100  Id.  
101  Id. at 72–73. 
102  Id. at 56. 
103  Id. at 46. 
104  See THE SECOND CHARTER OF VIRGINIA (May 23, 1609), http://ava-
lon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va02.asp [https://perma.cc/Q255-7H3Q] (granting title “up 
into the Land throughout from Sea to Sea, West and Northwest”). 
105  See discussion infra pp. 84–85.  
106  Patterson, supra note 85, at 46. 
107  Id. at 46–48.  
108  Patterson, supra note 85, at 47 (quoting Resolution on Western Lands (1880), in 18 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 915 (Worthington C Ford et. al. eds., 1904–1937)). 
109  Virginia Deed of Cession, in 26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 113–16 
(Worthington C. Ford et. al. eds., 1904–1937). 
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of the United States, on an equal footing with the original states in all respects 
whatever . . . .”110  
For Patterson, the first two documents are critically important because they 
tacitly recognize that neither the Continental nor Confederation Congresses had 
authority to acquire land on their own, nor to legislate for non-federated territo-
ries.111 Thus, the compact could not exist between the states and Congress; in-
stead, Congress invited the states to enter into a compact with each other.112 Vir-
ginia accepted that invitation and then set out potential terms, in turn inviting 
Congress to become trustee of the ceded lands—and the other landed states 
adopted Virginia’s language to the same effect.113 The resolution and subsequent 
deeds thus provide evidence of both the existence and conditions of a land trust.114 
Once the Confederation Congress accepted trusteeship, Patterson claims that “the 
compact was complete, and Congress was estopped from denying or violating its 
terms or conditions.”115 
The Northwest Ordinance is also important to Patterson for three reasons. 
First, it codified a “monumental scheme of state-building,” by prescribing in care-
ful specificity the number and size of new states to be created from particular land 
cessions.116 This evinces Patterson’s claim that the overriding purpose of the land 
cessions—and thus the trust—was to create new states. Second, the Ordinance 
provided an ersatz constitution for the administration of territorial government 
under Congressional supervision.117 As the Confederation Congress in fact lacked 
the authority to legislate for the territories in this way, Patterson argues that this 
would eventually justify new constitutional powers.118 Third, when reenacted in 
1789, the Ordinance established the First Federal Congress as successor-in-inter-
est to the trusteeship of the territorial lands.119 The terms of this trust would then 
limit the purposes for which Congress could use its new territorial powers—with 
the most important condition being the equal footing doctrine. 
With these foundational pieces in place, Patterson’s trust theory is essen-
tially complete. The terms of the first territorial cessions, and the Confederation 
Congress’s acceptance of those terms, established the original trust relationship: 
the unappropriated lands were to be held for the “common benefit” of future 
                                                        
110  NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. 5 (July 13, 1787), in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS 334, 339–42 (Worthington C. Ford et. al. eds., 1904-1937). 
111  Patterson, supra note 85, at 47. The important language for Patterson here is the phrase 
“for the common benefit of the United States.”  
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 49. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. 5, in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra 
note 110, at 334, 342. 
117  Id. at 338–341. 
118  Patterson, supra note 85, at 52–53. Indeed, James Madison famously commented on the 
Confederation’s woeful inadequacy in this regard: “All this [state-building] has been done . . . 
without the least colour of constitutional authority.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison). 
119  Patterson, supra note 85, at 69. 
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states. The Northwest Ordinance evinces both this purpose and the principle that 
new states were to enter the Union on an equal footing with the original members. 
To the degree that the Constitution—particularly the Property Clause—created 
new congressional powers over the territories, we must understand those powers 
as defined by the terms of the original compact. Thus, Congress can hold and 
regulate territory only until it falls within the boundaries of a new state, at which 
point it must release the land to ensure that the state begins life on equal terms. It 
is Patterson’s opinion that both Congress and the Supreme Court have abandoned 
these original understandings and thus reneged on a fundamental founding prom-
ise.120  
B. The “Trust Theory” Refuted 
Patterson’s arguments in support of the trust theory are largely historical, 
though he does make some other claims along the way. As discussed above, Pat-
terson’s approach finds no support in modern Property Clause doctrine, so it 
makes little sense to measure his position against governing case law. Rather, in 
this final subsection, I try to meet Patterson on his own ground. In what follows, 
then, I offer textual, historical, and structural reasons to reject the “trust theory” 
of the Property Clause. 
1. Constitutional Text   
There is virtually no text in the Constitution that supports the trust theory 
of the Property Clause. Again, the relevant language reads: “The Congress shall 
have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting 
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States[.]”121 Nothing here 
refers to any compact or trust with the states, nor is there any language suggesting 
terms of compulsory disposal. Indeed, quite the opposite: The plain meaning of 
“the power to dispose” naturally includes the authority to decide when, and on 
what terms, to do so—or whether to do so at all. The power to “make all needful 
Rules and Regulations” also seems very broad. Robert Natelson has argued that 
the word “needful” parallels language in the Enclave and Necessary and Proper 
Clauses, thus confining the regulatory power to enumerated purposes.122 Even 
this narrow textual claim is immediately undercut, however, by the sentence’s 
indirect object: “the Territory and other Property belonging to the United States.” 
If, as it appears, Congress enjoys the same rule-making authority over the “Ter-
ritor[ies]” as it does “other Property,” it is very difficult to find even an enumer-
ation requirement in the text.123 At least I am not aware of any serious claim that 
                                                        
120  Id. at 64–74 
121  U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
122  Natelson, supra note 85, at 363. 
123  There may be historical reasons—and Natelson suggests there are—to treat “Territory” 
and “other Property” differently here, but I see no purely textual basis for that claim. Natelson, 
supra note 85, at 366–76. 
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the word “needful” limits Congress’s territorial authority in this way.124 
The best quasi-textual claim that we might make for the trust theory is that 
the section in which the Property Clause appears is otherwise dedicated to the 
admission of new states.125 The immediately preceding clause reads: 
New states may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new States 
shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State 
be formed by the Junction of two or more states, or Parts of States, without the 
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.126 
This at least suggests that the drafters dedicated Article IV, Section 3 to the topic 
of new states and their admission, and that we should therefore read the Property 
Clause within that specific framework. Thus, we might conclude that the disposal 
and regulation of federal property is at least related to the admission of new 
states. It is here that any trust theory inference ends, however; and, indeed, the 
context actually begins to undermine Patterson’s views. With the admission of 
new states clearly in mind, why not include the “trust compact”—or at least the 
duty to dispose—among the other explicit conditions? Why not codify and ex-
plain the equal footing doctrine? In these circumstances, the silence is deafening.  
The constitutional text, then, does nothing to corroborate the trust theory. 
Quite the contrary, the total absence of any reference to the “original compact,” 
the trust conditions, the equal footing doctrine, or a duty to dispose of enclosed 
land strongly militates against Patterson’s claims. Nor does this silence imply 
non-enumeration or federal incapacity. On its face, the Property Clause’s text 
confers a power on Congress—the power to regulate and dispose of federal prop-
erty—it does nothing to limit congressional authority to acquire, retain, or man-
age such lands. As such, not only does the text fail to support the trust theory, it 
presents a substantial challenge to other arguments Patterson might marshal in 
its defense.  
2. Constitutional History  
A historical argument about constitutional meaning looks to what the draft-
ers’ and ratifiers’ thought a constitutional provision meant.127 As discussed 
above, the bulk of Patterson’s trust theory is an extended historical argument.  
While there is considerably more material to work with here than in the text 
alone, Patterson’s historical account generally falls victim—as many originalist 
                                                        
124  E.g., Hoover & Allison, v. Evatt, 325 U.S. 892, 881–82 (1945) (recognizing Congress’ 
plenary power in territories). 
125  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
126  Id. § 3, cl. 1. 
127  There are many schools of constitutional originalism. For an excellent overview, see gen-
erally Lawrence Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist 
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Grant 
Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds. 2011). I take Patterson to be taking some kind of an “in-
tentionalist” approach, which I critique own its own terms. Though I take no position here on 
competing originalist approaches, I do not see a compelling “public meaning” claim that might 
overcome the text’s plain modern meaning. 
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arguments do—to what David Hackett Fischer has called the “pragmatic fal-
lacy.”128 This occurs when a historian “selects facts—immediately and directly 
useful facts—in the service of a social cause.”129 In other words, Patterson selec-
tively presents the evidence that best supports his favored political theory, while 
deemphasizing or omitting other relevant evidence that paints a more nuanced or 
less persuasive picture. Although this fallacy is broadly evident here, in this lim-
ited space I focus on just a few problematic examples. In these instances, not 
only is the pragmatism easy to identity—indeed, it is sometimes as simple as 
selective quotation—but it also tends to undermine critical elements of the argu-
ment. 
First, Patterson relies heavily on the Continental Congress’s resolution in-
viting the cession of western lands, and on the Confederation Congress’s ac-
ceptance of those lands under the terms established in the Virginia Deed of Ces-
sion.130  He is undoubtedly correct that these documents evince a strong desire to 
see these territories formed into future states. Patterson’s pragmatism, however, 
becomes evident in his conclusory treatment of why the landless states wanted 
the land ceded and so divided. His brief and unsupported assumption on that 
score is that “the states were not interested in creating a great federal domain to 
be exploited by an imperial government.”131 If the principal motivation for di-
vesting the landed states and creating new ones was to forestall a federal em-
pire—then the rest of Patterson’s extra-textual assertions may at least be colora-
ble. Then these documents might, as he claims, provide “the basis for only a 
trusteeship of territory by Congress for the exclusive purpose of statehood, [and 
impose] a complete and absolute negative on the permanent holding of territory 
by Congress . . . .”132 
There is a wealth of other evidence, however, which suggests that limiting 
federal landholding was not one of the driving motivations behind the demands 
for western cession. And, in fact, federal land retention within future states might 
serve—or at least not frustrate—the states’ actual goals.133 Indeed, by their very 
terms the cessions increased federal lands and authority at the expense of the 
existing, landed states. This strongly suggests that it was primarily a fear of 
state—not federal—imperialism that motivated the landless states’ demands.134   
In truth, the hardest push for land cessions came from wealthy eastern spec-
ulators with dubious claims in the unappropriated territories, but Maryland made 
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130  Patterson, supra note 85, at 47–52. 
131  Id. at 46. 
132  Id. at 47. 
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134  Id. at 124, 200. 
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at least some effort to put a theoretical gloss on her demands.135 And, while some 
of her arguments were expressly self-interested (for instance, that the landless 
states had equally fought the British and were so entitled to some share of the 
territorial spoils), others were framed as more neutral assertions of republican 
political theory.136 There was, for example, the worry that, if Virginia’s popula-
tion grew to fill her unappropriated territorial claims, her sheer numbers and re-
sources would come to dominate federal politics.137 Alternatively, if it were left 
to Virginia to divide her territory into new states, these daughter polities would 
likely support the mother state in any federal contest.138 Thus, the landless states 
wanted Congress—which represented all the states—to administer and divide 
the unappropriated lands, so as to keep all on relatively equal political terms.139  
These purposes are apparent in Maryland’s initial Declaration to the Conti-
nental Congress, in the Instructions given Maryland’s delegates regarding the 
western territories, and in the very cession documents upon which Patterson re-
lies. The opening lines of Maryland’s Declaration assert a claim to all lands 
“gained from the king of Great Britain, or the native Indians by the blood and 
treasure of all, [which] ought therefore to be a common estate to be granted out 
on terms beneficial to all the United States . . . .”140 This language seems to be-
speak interstate jealousy more plainly than a fear of federal imperialism. Simi-
larly, the Maryland delegation’s Instructions claim that Virginia herself knew 
that governing her “extensive dominion” would require dividing the western ter-
ritory into new states “under the auspices and direction of the elder from whom 
no doubt it would receive its form of government, to whom it would be bound 
by some alliance, or confederacy, and by whose councils it would be influ-
enced.”141 Again, the worry here seems to be state—not federal—imperialism.  
With this in mind, the “trust” language Patterson quotes from the Continen-
tal Congress’s 1780 resolution seems to reflect interstate rivalry rather than a fear 
of federal overreach: “[T]he unappropriated lands . . . shall be disposed of for the 
common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed into distinct re-
publican states . . . hav[ing] the same rights . . . as the other states.”142 The “com-
mon benefit” here is not a trust for future states, but an assurance that the current 
states would share equally in the wealth of unappropriated lands, so that no single 
state might gain undue political advantage. Patterson also fails to include or ex-
plain the resolution’s unequivocal closing lines: “[T]he said lands shall be 
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granted and settled at such times and under such regulations as shall hereafter be 
agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled.”143 In clearer light, this 
omission seems strategic—because granting Congress complete dispositional 
authority (language which presages the Constitution’s Property Clause) makes 
very little sense if, as Patterson claims, the point of the cessions was to prevent a 
federal empire. When, however, we consider the evidence that the states had dis-
tinctly more provincial interests at heart, allocating this power to the neutral fed-
eral body is perfectly rational.144 
Similar pragmatism undermines Patterson’s account of the Northwest Or-
dinance and the equal footing doctrine. For example, Patterson’s treatment of the 
Ordinance radically deemphasizes the specific forum in which the new states 
were to enjoy equal standing.145 The full phrasing is as follows: “[A new] State 
shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the United States, on an 
equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever . . . .”146 While 
Patterson reproduces the italicized language outside of quotations, he willfully 
ignores its critical importance to the doctrine’s meaning.147 Indeed, the Ordi-
nance’s text repeatedly identifies the precise ground on which the new states 
would stand with equal feet—in Congress: “[New States must] share in the fed-
eral councils on an equal footing with the original States . . . .”148 In other words, 
there were to be no subservient “little Virginias” in the Confederation to upset 
the balance of political power. The equal footing doctrine, then, speaks to a new 
states’ equal status in the federal legislature—not to an absolute equality of size, 
wealth, population, resources, or anything else.149 Frankly, the sort of all-encom-
passing equality “in all respects whatever” to which Patterson repeatedly appeals 
borders on the absurd. 
This also explains how the Ordinance—and all subsequent enabling acts—
can contain both an equal footing clause and some version of a disclaimer clause. 
That is, the Ordinance both promises the new states equality and declares that 
“[t[he legislatures of [the new] States, shall never interfere with primary disposal 
of the soil by the United States in Congress assembled.”150 Nevada’s Enabling 
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Act—like many other states’—is even clearer. On the one hand, the Act guaran-
tees admission “into the Union upon an equal footing with the original states, in 
all respects whatsoever”; while on the other it requires Nevadan’s to “forever 
disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within [the] 
territory, [which] shall be and remain at the sole and entire disposition of the 
United States[.]”151 On Patterson’s account, these provisions are simply incom-
patible. If equal footing requires the federal government to turn all enclosed pub-
lic lands over to a new state upon admission, Congress cannot simultaneously 
require that state to disclaim all title to those lands. Given the correct reading, 
however, no such incompatibility arises: Equal footing speaks only to a new 
state’s political standing in Congress, not to its ownership of public lands.  
Upon closer examination, then, Patterson’s historical arguments in support 
of the trust theory cannot bear the weight he asks of them. It is certainly true that 
the original states expected that Congress would divide the unappropriated terri-
tories into new states, and it is equally true that these new states were to enjoy 
equal political standing in the federal legislature. This much is plainly evident in 
the documentary evidence that Patterson presents. It may even be true that the 
states envisioned Congress acting as a kind of trustee over these territories, 
though that is less evident in the sources. There is virtually no evidence, however, 
that the terms of that trust required Congress to relinquish all enclosed landhold-
ings to a new state upon its admission to the Union. Quite to the contrary, the 
documents upon which Patterson relies expressly grant Congress sole authority 
to decide when and how to dispose of the ceded lands. This seems strange or 
incongruent only if we accept Patterson’s unsupported claims that the purpose of 
the land cessions was to preempt federal empire building. When, however, we 
consider the ample evidence that the states were much more concerned about 
their neighbors’ ambitions than they were about Congress’s, their trust in federal 
disposition is entirely appropriate. Even on his own documentary ground, then, 
Patterson’s historical arguments are ultimately unpersuasive. 
3. Constitutional Structure 
Structural arguments about constitutional meaning draw inferences from 
the relationships between constitutional institutions and actors.152 Probably the 
best-known sorts of structural arguments are those based in the separation of 
powers or in principles of federalism. Patterson’s arguments about the relation-
ship between Congress, the original states, and the new states are thus paradig-
matic structural claims. What Patterson does not adequately consider, however, 
are the structural changes that occurred when the Articles of Confederation gave 
way to the Constitution. That is, the relationship between the People, the state 
governments, and the federal government changed radically in 1789; and, even 
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if we were to assume arguendo that Patterson’s trust theory was correct in the 
early 1780s, that understanding did not survive ratification of the Constitution. 
While the Articles of Confederation might rightly be seen as a kind of com-
pact or league between independent sovereign states,153 the Constitution plainly 
establishes an entirely new form of government—one which reimagines sover-
eignty in unprecedented ways.154 First, the Constitution established ultimate sov-
ereignty in “the People,” who therein delegated limited and contingent sovereign 
authority to various government institutions given various specified conditions. 
Second, in the Constitution, the People divided certain aspects of the traditional 
sovereign prerogative among three separate federal branches: the legislature, the 
executive, and the judiciary.155 Finally, the People entirely restructured the fed-
eralist relationship by reallocating to the national government sovereign powers 
previously lodged solely in the state governments.156 And most importantly, for 
present purposes, it was the People—not the states—that ratified the Constitu-
tion. Thus, whatever trust compact the state governments might have had with 
the Confederate Congress, it was superseded by a new relationship between the 
People and the federal Congress.  If the old Congress had held the land in trust 
for the states, the new one now held it in trust for the People. 
At the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, James Wilson described these 
fundamental structural changes, quoting language he himself had penned in Phil-
adelphia: 
This, Mr. President, is not a government founded upon a compact [between the 
states]; it is founded upon the power of the people. They express it in their name 
and their authority, “We, the people, do ordain and establish” &c.; from their 
ratification, and their ratification alone, it is to take its constitutional authentic-
ity[.]157  
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It is of course true that ratification required the assent of nine of the thirteen 
states, but this was largely a matter of logistics—a way of organizing debate and 
voting among the People. This is evident in the Constitution’s assignment of rat-
ification to conventions rather than to the state legislatures.158 Evolved from Eng-
lish practice, a “convention” is an ultra vires meeting of the sovereign people, 
who in this case acted outside and above the delegated authority of the state leg-
islatures—in much the same way the drafters had done in Philadelphia.159 Indeed, 
these conventions were interrelated: the extra-legality of the proposed Constitu-
tion required an extra-legal act of sovereign ratification to become law.160 After 
all, legally altering the Articles of Confederation required the unanimous consent 
of the state legislatures, not the approval of just nine.161 Instead, the framers took 
an appeal over the states’ heads, to the sovereign power itself. 
What this means for present purposes is that the new Congress no longer 
existed as the creation or agent of the various state sovereigns; it was instead a 
superior power unto itself, authorized in the People’s name. Thus, whatever com-
pact might have existed between the states and the Confederation Congress, it 
became void when the former entities changed shape, and the latter ceased to 
exist. The new Congress served the People, not the states; and if it acted as a 
trustee of public lands, it did so only on behalf of the People, not the states. Even 
if reenactment of the Northwest Ordinance did evince the terms of some trust 
arrangement, the beneficiary had necessarily changed—and it is simply inappo-
site for a state to now lay claim to the People’s land. And this, of course, means 
all the People, not just the citizens of a particular state or municipality. The fed-
eral government that emerged from ratification now dutifully manages its public 
lands for the common benefit of a national—not a provincial—constituency. 
CONCLUSION 
On January 8 of this year, Cliven Bundy stood on the steps of the federal 
courthouse in Las Vegas, a free man for the first time in nearly two years. The 
federal District Court had just dismissed all charges arising from his armed stand-
off with BLM officers in 2014, and his first words were, “We’re not done with 
this.”162 His defiance is hardly surprising, and we should expect to hear much 
more from the Bundy family and its supporters about the illegality of federal land 
ownership in the West. I hope I have demonstrated here that, as a legal matter, 
these claims have very little merit. Through the Constitution, the People firmly 
entrusted the management of national public lands to Congress, and theories that 
suggest otherwise are seriously flawed. For this reason, modern constitutional 
doctrine strongly supports the federal government’s authority to own and manage 
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land within state boundaries.  It seems very unlikely indeed that the Bundys have 
a path forward in either the state or federal courts. 
That is not to say that there is no place for dissenting views on public land 
management in the West. It is to say, however, that the Bundy’s best arguments 
are (and have always been) political and not legal. There is almost no chance 
that the federal courts will reverse more than a century of constitutional doctrine 
and try to force Congress to relinquish its landholdings in Nevada or anywhere 
else. But there is at least some chance that Congress or the Executive might revise 
its approach to national land management policy. Whether those revisions in-
volve more focus on agricultural interests, greater public input on regulated land 
swaps, or more direct local involvement at the policymaking level, the political 
climate is as ripe for change as it has been in decades. Now that he has seized a 
national microphone, Cliven Bundy should make the most of this once-in-a-life-
time opportunity by fighting on the most advantageous ground. Don’t take it to 
court; take it to Congress. 
